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Abstract: Predictive processing as a computational motif of the neocortex needs to 
be elaborated into theories of higher cognitive functions that include simulating 
future behavioural outcomes. We contribute to the neuroscientific perspective of 
predictive processing as a foundation for the proposed representational 
architectures of the mind.   
 
Main text: By endeavouring to integrate predictive processing theories of brain 
function with human capacity for prospective thought, Gilead, Trope and Liberman 
have identified a subject matter that invites rigorous empirical focus. The current 
evidence for predictive processing is biased towards the field of perception. Such 
data is essential, but this bias leaves open questions about how neuronal prediction 
contributes to ‘offline’ brain processing in which we can flexibly traverse space and 
time in our mental activity. As cognition is predictive, we should now pursue a 
framework for predictive neuronal processing that is ‘abstracted away’ from 
proximal sensory inputs and used instead for prospective deduction or future 
simulation. The authors have initiated a thought-provoking account of how abstract 
representational elements supporting predictive cognition could be structured, and 
their structure bridges from perception science to cognitive psychology. We 
highlight the neurobiology of predictive processing as a subdivision for developing 
this framework. 
Predictive brain frameworks prescribe specific neuronal processes. These 
processes can be summarized such that the hierarchical brain compares sensory 
inputs with internally generated models of the world, aiming to minimize error 
signals that indicate a mismatch and result in internal model revision (Friston, 
2005). There are various mechanistic implementations of this computation (George 
& Hawkins, 2009; Spratling 2017), but broadly speaking, neuronal markers of 
prediction should reveal (aspects of) these coding principles. The authors have 
examined how neuroscience data, specifically human functional neuroimaging, 
corroborates their proposed structure of abstract representations. Brain signatures 
have been observed that support the distinct abstracta they describe, especially so 
for modality-specific and multimodal abstracta. The element of the model where 
“abstractness” is greatest, that is categorical abstracta and predicator 
representation, warrants to be investigated more sufficiently in brain imaging 
experiments testing predictive processing, but the authors provide a plausible 
hypothesis for how this could be realised in specific hubs of the default mode 
network (DMN). Under the assumption that identical computations (i.e. prediction) 
support all functions throughout the brain’s hierarchy, the distinction between 
perceptual and cognitive processing is eliminated. As such, future data should 
confirm the hierarchy of inference differs in the content of mental representation at 
each layer (not the computation), and areas processing abstract representations for 
predictive cognition should reveal neuronal indicators of prediction. In line with 
this, the putative involvement of the default mode network in ‘offline’ processing to 
probabilistically simulate future outcomes can be described in the context of 
Markov Decision Processes (Dohmatob et al., 2018). This mathematical framework 
is in line with predictive neuronal processing in the default mode network, which is 
supported by experiments showing that the DMN overlaps with areas involved in 
forming associations (from which predictions are derived, Bar, 2007).   
 How close are we to testing a model of the predictive neural bases of 
conceptual cognition? Taking the perspective that the brain performs predictive 
cognition for mental time travel, one approach is to test the brain’s generation of 
sensory inputs that are decoupled from perception. Mental imagery can be used to 
test internally-driven events, and such data have been interpreted within predictive 
processing frameworks. For example, analysis of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging data data reveals that vividness of visual imagery increases the top-down 
coupling of signals from frontal areas to early visual areas (Dijkstra et al., 2017). 
This finding fits with the role of cortical feedback carrying descending predictions 
from high to low areas, even in the absence of sensory input. Further, in primary 
sensory areas, brain imaging studies of illusions and mental imagery reveal that 
processing during perception is generative,  for example, as observed  visual 
counterstreams. In primary visual cortex it is possible to partition feedforward and 
feedback signals, this is crucial because these pathways transmit sensory versus 
internal processes respectively (or ascending prediction errors and descending 
predictions). We propose studying cortical layers in humans as a neuronal substrate 
allowing for mental time travel alongside perceptual processing. We motivate this 
hypothesis using high-resolution brain imaging showing that neuronal codes exist 
for abstract mental representations transferred by cortical feedback to sensory 
areas (Bergmann et al., 2019), and that sensory cortex allows for predictive 
processing mechanisms to be precisely spatiotemporally mapped (e.g. Edwards et 
al., 2017). Taking visual imagery as an example of counterfactual processing, deep 
cortical layers of visual cortex are involved in maintaining visual information 
specific to mental imagery (Bergmann et al., 2019). A dual stream of factual and 
counterfactual information processing might provide insight to higher cognitive 
functions in which potential future outcomes need to be simulated before informed 
decisions can be executed. The inherent challenge however in investigating 
prediction machinery in higher, abstract, psychological function is that we have 
diminished control over the content of internal representations and we have to 
probe brain areas that do not easily allow for the separation of sensory from 
internally-generated processes. 
Developing the authors’ account will now require, in part, overcoming the 
challenge of understanding if and how neuronal substrates of abstract mental 
representation, even those that confer predictive mental abilities such as projecting 
oneself forward in time, are one and the same as neuronal prediction. Towards the 
aim of a testable model of the neural bases of conceptual cognition, it will be 
essential to develop the description of higher cognitive functions within the 
parsimonious framework of predictive processing. This framework should span 
disciplines by defining common concepts and terminology. In doing so, it is 
imperative to avoid a language surplus as seen previously with terminology that was 
justified either on behavioural data alone, or in connection with specific paradigms, 
without providing a reduction into descriptions of neuronal processes. For example, 
attention has often been defined based on behavioural advantages without direct 
neuronal explanations, but might be more thoroughly and accurately explained as 
optimizing the precision of prediction error by increasing the synaptic gain of these 
neurons (Feldman and  Friston, 2010; Gordon et al., 2019).  The target article 
provides a descriptive framework of abstract representations for predictive 
cognition onto which we can map neuronal data, which should comprise neuronal 
recordings, simulated data and models, and behavioural measures in order to 
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